Bush's January 2007 decision to send an extra 20,000 troops to Iraq was criticized for deepening the unpopular conflict but has since been credited with sharply reducing the violence.

Citing secret memorandums and interviews with a host of current and former officials, the Times said Bush's decision to increase troops for a counterinsurgency in Iraq came after months of tumultuous debate within the administration.

Bush's tendency to defer to commanders in the field and his defense secretary had delayed a new approach to Iraq until the situation bordered on anarchy and "civil war," as a late 2006 CIA analysis termed it, the Times reported. At that point the Pentagon was in favor of moving responsibility to Iraqi forces, facilitating U.S. troop reductions.

The State Department was pushing an alternative plan to fight al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, reining in Baghdad's violence and stemming sectarian violence only when it reached the level of "mass killing," the Times reported. The U.S. ambassador to Baghdad was arguing for authority to negotiate a political solution with the Iraqis.

"The proposals to send more U.S. forces to Iraq would not produce a long-term solution and would make our policy less, not more, sustainable," the newspaper quoted ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad as writing in a classified cable.

By Tom Hayden | September 10, 2008

Bob Woodward's final book on the Bush years in Iraq, The War Within, reports that top secret American targeting and assassination operations--extra-judicial killings--were "very possibly" the biggest factor in reducing violence in 2006-07, even more than the so-called troop surge itself.

He writes that the "groundbreaking" operations were carried out as Special Access Programs or under the Special Compartmentalized Information effort.

Woodward and his editors consider this strategy of summary executions of "key individuals in extremist groups" so ultra-sensitive that they chose not to reveal "the state secrets that have been so beneficial to Iraq."
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Some immediate questions:

• Since the Iraqis on the receiving end presumably know about these tactics, why keep them secret from the American public, Congress and media?

• How are the operations consistent with US constitutional law and international human rights standards?

• Are they joint US-Iraqi operations, or only US operations?

• Are those targeted for execution carrying out any military action at the time, or do their names only have to appear on target lists?

• Did the target lists come from Iraqi informants or official sources, and how were they verified?

• Why were the targets killed instead of being detained?

• How many targeted individuals were killed or made to disappear?

• Who in the Administration, Congress and upper echelons of the media have known, and for how long?

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"We have to win," Bush insisted, repeating his public and private mantra. [US Army General George W.] Casey [jr.] had heard the President's line dozens of times. "I'm with you," he replied. "I understand that. But to win, we have to draw down. We have to bring our force levels down to ones that are sustainable both for them and for us."

Casey felt that the Iraqis, a proud people and resistant to the Western occupation, needed to take over. The large, visible US force was ultimately a sign of disrespect. Worse, the prolonged occupation was making the Iraqis dependent. Each time additional US troops arrived, they soon seemed indispensable.

The Iraqis needed to take back their country and their self-respect, so central to Arab culture. They needed to fight their own war and run their own government; they were doing neither.

Casey studied Bush's face, now wrinkled and showing its 59 years, the right eye slightly more closed than the left under greying, fulleyebrows.

The general had pushed for a drawdown for two years. And while the President had always approved the strategy, he no longer seemed to buy Casey's argument. "I know I've got work to do to convince you of that," the general said, "but I firmly believe that."

Bush looked sceptical. "I need to do a better job explaining to you" why winning means getting out, Casey said.

"You do," Bush replied.

Casey had long concluded that one big problem with the war was the President himself. He later told a colleague in private that he had the impression that Bush reflected the "radical wing of the Republican Party that kept saying, 'Kill the bastards! Kill the bastards! And you'll succeed."' Since the beginning, the President had viewed the war in conventional terms, repeatedly asking how many of the various enemies had been captured or killed.
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When President Bush told Gen. Casey in a trip to Baghdad in June 2006 that "we have to win," Casey replied, "But to win, we have to draw down." It remained his dogged mantra as Baghdad collapsed all around him.

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Peter Pace, commissioned a group of colonels to review war strategy for the chiefs. One of their presentations ended starkly, "We are not winning, so we are losing." Woodward writes, "Chairman Pace had an unusual sullen look on his face, almost crestfallen, as if to say, 'How could I not have realized this."'
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Now, if these military officials had deep concerns about Bush's "win at all cost" attitude, what would their opinion of McCain be? And if they've had their fill of presidents/VP's with no national security experience, what the heck are they going to think of Palin?

A new study released today by the University of California, Los Angeles concludes that ethnic violence — not the Bush administration’s surge — was the primary factor in reducing violence in Iraq. As FP Passport notes, researchers used satellite imagery from the Pentagon to track “electricity use in Iraq before, during, and after the surge took place”:

“If the surge had truly ‘worked,’ we would expect to see a steady increase in night-light output over time,” says Thomas Gillespie, one of the co-authors, in a press release. “Instead, we found that the night-light signature diminished in only certain neighborhoods, and the pattern appears to be associated with ethno-sectarian violence and neighborhood ethnic cleansing.”

Last year, the Government Accountability Office also said that “there might be fewer attacks because you have ethnically cleansed neighborhoods, particularly in the Baghdad area.” Similarly, in April, CNN’s Michael Ware told ThinkProgress that if “anyone is telling you that the cleansing of Baghdad has not contributed to the fall in violence, then they either simply do not understand Baghdad or they are lying to you.” More here Iraq’s unresolved tensions.
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"If the surge had truly 'worked,' we would expect to see a steady increase in night-light output over time," says Thomas Gillespie, one of the co-authors, in a press release. "Instead, we found that the night-light signature diminished in only certain neighborhoods, and the pattern appears to be associated with ethno-sectarian violence and neighborhood ethnic cleansing."

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The surge was designed specifically to improve material conditions of life and create a breathing space for political compromise between major factions in the capital city. It was not simply about reducing US military casualties. As with so much of the verbal redefinition of terms that has gone on over the course of the Iraq war (from `war on terror' and `pacification' to `security contractors' and `vigorous interrogation'), the term `surge' has been rewritten since late 2007 to signify a reduction in the overall level of violence when that was only one of the original criteria for increasing troop levels in the capital city. As Baghdad went, so would Iraq. That was the hope. But what has been the empirical reality?

Given conditions on the ground, notwithstanding a dramatic decrease in US military casualties through the spring of 2008, it is hard to establish clear empirical indicators of how things have been going. Continuing high levels of violence across the city have made for great difficulty in collecting local information in a systematic manner.
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