This book details the numerous times the CIA interacted with the FBI. In particular, the times lead FBI Cole investigator, Ali Soufan, made several official requests to the CIA: one through FBI Director Freeh, asking for any information the CIA had on an al Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur and on Khallad Bin Attash, (at that time thought to be mastermind on the Cole bombing).
Despite the fact that the CIA did indeed have this information, they either denied its existence or refused to respond to Soufan's requests. The CIA withheld material information from an ongoing FBI investigation, which was a crime, and not due to the fact that "the CIA did not talk to the FBI", as suggested by the 9/11 Commission report.
In July 2001, emails between high-level CIA managers and CIA officers, entered into evidence in the Moussaoui trial, indicated that Mihdhar was going to take part in the next big al Qaeda attack. When these CIA officers requested permission to transfer this information to the FBI, they were denied. Yet, at
almost the same time, CIA Director Tenet was holding meetings at the White House describing a huge al Qaeda attack about to take place inside of the US.
On August 22, 2001, when the CIA discovered that both Mihdhar and Hazmi were in the US, the CIA knew they were here to take part in a huge al Qaeda attack. Yet, the CIA, working with FBI IOS agents at FBI HQ, sabotaged the last chance FBI Cole investigators would have to investigate Mihdhar and prevent the
attacks on 9/11. The CIA concealed the photograph of Khallad taken at Kuala Lumpur that connected Mihdhar to the planning of the Cole bombing. FBI HQ agents also concealed the fact that they had received the NSA release from the NSA caveats the very day they told the FBI Cole investigators they were
forbidden from investigating Mihdhar, due to NSA caveats. FBI HQ agents then fabricated a NSLU ruling, and told the FBI Cole investigators that the NSLU had ruled they were not allowed to be part of any investigation for Mihdhar when in fact the NSLU attorneys had ruled just the opposite, and stated to FBI IG investigators that the Cole investigators could have been part of the investigation for Mihdhar, since the NSA information had no FISA component. (9/11 Commission report, Footnote 81, p 581)
This new information shows that almost 3000 innocent people in the US paid, with their lives, for the actions at the CIA and FBI HQ, actions that should have been uncovered by the 9/11 Commission, using the very same new information, easily obtainable with their subpoena powers.
This criminal activity was carried out by individuals at the CIA Bin Laden unit, the CIA Yemen station, high level managers at the CIA, who prevented the transfer of information regarding the Kuala Lumpur meeting to the FBI investigators, the FBI Bin laden unit, the FBI RFU and even by the Director of